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STEERING LOAN MODIFICATIONS POSTPANDEMIC
PAMELA FOOHEY*, DALIÉ JIMÉNEZ**, & CHRISTOPHER K. ODINET***
I
INTRODUCTION
For a brief moment in early 2020, as policymakers and the public became
more aware of the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic, it seemed like Congress
might provide Americans with true relief during an unprecedented time.
Although Congress passed three relief bills during the pandemic, the majority of
relief delivered to households came in the form of debt forbearance. The
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”), which
took effect at the end of March 2020,1 included three key moratoria—a
foreclosure moratorium for homeowners, an eviction moratorium for renters,
and a student loan payment moratorium—all of which were continued through
mid to late 2021.2
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1. CARES Act is short for the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act. Congress
passed and the President signed the CARES Act into law on March 27, 2020. CARES Act, Pub. L. No.
116–36, § 2102(a)(3) (2020), https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr748/BILLS-116hr748enr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R39P-9M23].
2. Michelle Singletary, The Federal Foreclosure Moratorium Has Ended. Struggling Homeowners
May Still Be Able to Keep Their Homes, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/08/03/faq-foreclosure-moratorium-ending/
[https://perma.cc/N5B3-7ZMH]; Adam Liptak & Glenn Thrush, Supreme Court Ends Biden’s Eviction
Moratorium, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/26/us/eviction-moratoriumends.html [https://perma.cc/3ZTZ-LYVX]; Michelle Singletary, Student Loan Relief is Extended Until
Jan. 31, 2022. Here’s What You Need to Know., WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/2021/08/06/student-loan-payment-pause/ [https://perma.cc/39HC-5LLY]. Before it ended,
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau proposed rules that would ban mortgage servicers from
foreclosing until 2022. CFPB Proposes Mortgage Servicing Changes to Prevent Wave of COVID-19
Foreclosures, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Apr. 5, 2021), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/cfpb-proposes-mortgage-servicing-changes-to-prevent-wave-of-covid-19-foreclosures/
[https://perma.cc/W5HL-8UD9]. After the decision to extend the eviction moratorium, some states, such
as New York, extended their own state-wide eviction bans. Nell Clark, New York Extends Its Eviction
Moratorium Through End Of 2021, NPR (Sept. 2, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/09/02/
1033634413/new-york-extends-its-eviction-moratorium-through-end-of-2021 [https://perma.cc/5DKKJWCP].
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Soon after the CARES Act was passed, we published a series of papers
critiquing the relief provided to American households.3 As we detailed in The
Folly of Credit As Pandemic Relief, these three moratoria amounted to
extensions of credit.4 People were temporarily relieved of their obligations to pay
their mortgages and student loans, and their landlords could not evict them if
they did not pay their rent. But eventually, extensions of credit still require
payment. Although they gave people breathing room, upon the moratoria’s
expirations, people will again face these debt obligations. Indeed, when the
foreclosure moratorium ended in July 2021, foreclosure activity increased.5
This Article focuses on the likely fallout for American households as a result
of expiring moratoria and provides a regulatory path for steering creditors to
offer borrowers workable loan modifications or else to bring people to the point
of reckoning with their debts in bankruptcy. For each forborne debt, borrowers
will have to make up the missed payments in some way. Depending on the deals
that borrowers entered with their creditors during the moratorium period,
assuming they entered into a deal at all, loan terms may extend by the number of
missed payments or regular payments may increase to spread the missed
payments over the remaining life of the loan. Regardless of the details of each
deal, in the near future, people will have to face the large debt obligations that
come with mortgages, auto loans, and credit cards. Similarly, people who did not
need forbearance of certain debts during the pandemic may find themselves
unable to keep up with their debts and in danger of defaulting.
With individuals and families now facing the pandemic’s economic
repercussions, many are likely to be in worse financial shape than they were in
pre-pandemic. Although unemployment declined in 2021,6 racial and ethnic
minorities’ unemployment rates remained high.7 In the third quarter of 2021,
3. Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez, & Christopher K. Odinet, The Debt Collection Pandemic, 11
CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 222 (2020) [hereinafter The Debt Collection Pandemic],
http://www.californialawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/JimenezFooheyOdinet_DebtCollectionPandemic_CalLRev-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PUS3-A24W]; Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez, & Christopher K. Odinet, The Folly of
Credit As Pandemic Relief, 68 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 126, 129 (2020) [hereinafter The Folly of Credit As
Pandemic Relief], https://www.uclalawreview.org/the-folly-of-credit-as-pandemic-relief/
[https://perma.cc/HD6W-RGB7]; Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez, & Christopher K. Odinet, CARES Act
Gimmicks: How Not To Give People Money During A Pandemic And What To Do Instead, 2020 U. ILL.
L. REV. ONLINE 81 (2020) [hereinafter Cares Act Gimmicks], https://www.illinoislaw
review.org/online/cares-act-gimmicks/ [https://perma.cc/LTR8-TGUS].
4. See generally The Folly of Credit As Pandemic Relief, supra note 3, (arguing that “Congress got
the balance between providing true money versus what amount to credit products to people
fundamentally backwards[,]” resulting in “a serious error that will have enduring negative
consequences”).
5. August 2021 U.S. Foreclosure Activity Rises Following the End of the Foreclosure Moratorium,
ATTOM (Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.attomdata.com/news/market-trends/foreclosures/attom-august2021-u-s-foreclosure-market-report/ [https://perma.cc/4RXV-KEKR].
6. Christopher Rugaber, US Jobless Rate Sinks to 4.2% as Many More People Find Jobs, AP NEWS
(Dec. 3, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/coronavirus-pandemic-health-business-unemploymenteconomy-e62c5ed35f69bc763a6d297858ceb084 [https://perma.cc/Z7B3-SB2Q].
7. State Unemployment by Race and Ethnicity, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Nov. 2021),
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Black workers and Latine workers were sixty-five and fifty-two percent more
likely than white workers to be unemployed, respectively.8 Women also dealt
with greater and more persistent rates of unemployment during 2021, although
they too experienced recovery toward the end of the year.9
Between the CARES Act, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021,10 and
the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (“ARP”),11 American households
received some, but almost certainly not enough, direct money relief to deal with
the pandemic’s financial fallout. Across the three relief packages, eligible
individuals and families received direct payments ranging from $3,200 to $6,400,
plus a total of up to $2,500 for each qualifying dependent.12 Each of the relief
packages also included enhanced unemployment benefits,13 and the ARP
increased the child tax credit.14 The relief provided to American households,
particularly in the ARP, is a momentous achievement. Relief payments,
unemployment benefits, and the child tax credit delivered much needed cash to
https://www.epi.org/indicators/state-unemployment-race-ethnicity/ [https://perma.cc/V76J-4AXK].
8. Id.
9. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Talmon Joseph Smith, Job Gains Offer a Brighter Picture of the U.S.
Economy, NY TIMES (Nov. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/05/business/economy/october2021-jobs-report.html [https://perma.cc/4PZ6-5CBD] (depicting improvement in unemployment
numbers for women at the end of 2021); Kweilen Ellingrud & Liz Hilton Segal, COVID-19 Has Driven
Millions of Women Out of the Workforce. Here’s How To Help Them Come Back, FORTUNE (Feb. 13,
2021), https://fortune.com/2021/02/13/covid-19-women-workforce-unemployment-gender-gap-recovery/
[https://perma.cc/PP6B-VXJZ] (illustrating the unemployment disparities that existed throughout much
of 2021).
10. Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 on December 21, 2020, and the
President signed the Act into law on December 27, 2020. See President Signs the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.ssa.gov/legislation/legis_
bulletin_122720.html [https://perma.cc/D4N9-SA4M]. The bill is available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-116hr133enr/pdf/BILLS-116hr133enr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2M2J-3Y57].
11. Congress passed the ARP on March 10, 2021 and the President signed the Act into law on March
11, 2021. See Grace Seggers, Biden Signs $1.9 Trillion American Rescue Plan Into Law, CBS NEWS
(March 11, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/biden-signs-covid-relief-bill-american-rescue-planinto-law/ [https://perma.cc/S3LE-86QD]. The bill is available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/117thcongress/house-bill/1319/text [https://perma.cc/2F4G-NTYB].
12. See CARES Act Gimmicks, supra note 3, at 83–84 (identifying amounts of first direct payment);
President Signs the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, supra note 10 (identifying amounts of second
direct payment); American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, NAT. CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 9, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/ncsl-in-dc/publications-and-resources/american-rescue-plan-act-of-2021.aspx
[https://perma.cc/EZ34-AS49] (identifying amounts of third direct payment).
13. See CARES Act Gimmicks, supra note 3, at 137–40 (describing unemployment benefits); Jillian
de Chavez-Lau & Jenna D. Russell, The 2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act Extends Pandemic
Unemployment Benefits, NAT. L. REV. (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/2021consolidated-appropriations-act-extends-pandemic-unemployment-benefits
[https://perma.cc/B6ZEUYYX] (detailing the Consolidated Appropriations Act); Seggers, supra note 11 (discussing the ARP).
14. Fact Sheet: The American Rescue Plan Will Deliver Immediate Economic Relief to Families,
TREASURY DEP’T (Mar. 18, 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/fact-sheet-theamerican-rescue-plan-will-deliver-immediate-economic-relief-to-families
[https://perma.cc/A6WWWP34]; Carmen Reinicke, New $3,000 Child Tax Credit Might Not Come With Monthly Payments, IRS
Says, CNBC (Mar. 19, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/19/the-3000-child-tax-credit-might-not-besent-via-monthly-payments.html [https://perma.cc/DS84-SHXD].
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people as they struggled amidst layoffs and reduced work hours, closure of
schools and daycares, and shutdowns and stay-at-home mandates.
Nonetheless, even with the labor market recovery, the length of the pandemic
has left millions of households in a deep financial hole, one that relief payments
and other enacted measures will not fully fill. It will likely take years for many
people to recover financially. National and state-level moratoria on eviction,
foreclosure, and student loan payments all will have expired by early 2022.15 If
other creditors, such as auto and credit card servicers, have agreed to pause or
alter people’s debt payments, those deals also will expire. People will have to
budget for increased debt payments. Many people may not have the liquidity to
meet all their ongoing expenses. Added to this will be renewed housing
payments, student loan payments, and other previously paused or reduced debt
payments. Something will have to give. People may fall behind on their
obligations, leading them to ask their lenders or servicers for help or to default,
which could spark a wave of debt collection lawsuits, repossessions, and
foreclosures, as we previously predicted in The Debt Collection Pandemic.16
Part II of this Article picks up at the point of people’s impending defaults on
various forms of consumer credit.17 To avoid losing their homes, cars, and seeing
their credit scores destroyed, people may seek help from their creditors. As such,
this Article focuses specifically on auto loans, credit cards, unsecured personal
loans, and other installment or revolving loans.
As detailed in Part III, consumer borrowers will find that their lenders’
obligations to work with them vary significantly, which will complicate navigating
possible loan modifications. Servicers (whether they hold the loan or not) lack
incentives to alter the status quo to streamline their current loan modification
procedures before they experience an uptick in modification requests. Once
requests start to pile up, some lenders may use people’s desperation and lack of
specific knowledge to place borrowers in unaffordable loan modifications geared
less toward helping the individual get back on track and more toward keeping
them in the “sweat box” of credit.18 Other lenders may hastily offer a modification
that does not consider the borrower’s ability to successfully repay the modified
loan. Under either scenario, modification failures may abound, similar to what
15. See Liptak & Thrush, supra note 2 (stating the end dates of each moratoria).
16. See generally The Debt Collection Pandemic, supra note 3, at 240 (“The inevitable result, though,
was to put millions of Americans at risk for debt collection.”).
17. This Article does not focus on student loans, which largely are under the purview of the
Department of Education (DOE), and which the DOE, amendments to bankruptcy law, and Congress
are better able to address. See Dalié Jiménez & Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt is a Civil Rights Issue:
The Case for Debt Relief and Higher Education Reform, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 131, 165–97 (2020)
(arguing for broad-based cancelation and reform of higher education funding based on the effect of using
student debt as the primary means of funding higher education).
18. See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL.
L. REV. 375, 391–92 (showing examples of modifications that keep borrowers in the “sweat box”); see
also Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter, & Deborah Thorne, Life in the Sweatbox, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 219–26 (2018) (describing the “sweatbox” and showing its prevalence through
data).
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happened in the mortgage market after the 2008 financial crisis. Debt settlement
mills and other companies selling scams are almost certain to emerge, as they did
during the Great Recession’s foreclosure crisis.19 Overall, the current lack of
structure for loan modifications across consumer credit products has the strong
potential to result in lenders offering people modifications that will fail or push
people toward less than reputable debt consolidation companies that likewise will
result in people defaulting on their modified loans.20
In light of this trajectory, Part IV introduces and advocates for regulatory
intervention, via the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)’s
statutory powers, to incentivize and steer consumer credit lenders to offer
sustainable loan modifications. Specifically, the CFPB should issue a compliance
bulletin which directs loan servicers to make a reasonable determination whether
a borrower has the ability to make all required, scheduled payments in
connection with any loan modification. Given the CFPB’s scope, this intervention
can target direct auto lenders, credit card issuers, and other lenders that offer
people revolving credit or installment loans. This Part also discusses oversight of
these modifications, with an eye toward ensuring that those people
disproportionately sold subprime, expensive loans, particularly communities of
color, will have access to beneficial modification deals.21
Part V of this Article concludes by considering the effects of requiring lenders
to provide people with workable loan modifications. This Article advocates for
an “ability to repay” structure for two key reasons. First, it will result in lenders
placing people into modifications that they are likely to be able to meet over the
long term. Second, it will result in lenders telling some people that they do not
qualify for loan modifications based on their financial situation. For these
borrowers, filing bankruptcy may be their best option, even considering its
expense and negative consequences.22 Yet research shows that people typically
will seriously struggle to pay their debts for years before resorting to bankruptcy,
sacrificing their well-being and approaching their lenders for help while they
19. See Federal and State Agencies Target Mortgage Relief, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 24, 2009),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2009/11/federal-state-agencies-target-mortgage-reliefscams [https://perma.cc/6C4W-AWYL] (detailing a federal operation to combat scams in the wake of the
2008 financial crisis).
20. At present, because the United States is still dealing with the pandemic, there is no robust
evidence that we know of regarding loan modification of these consumer credit products. This Article’s
insights extrapolate from prior crises, particularly the Great Recession. See infra Part
III.
21. Manisha Padi, Contractual Inequality, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 42),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3915707 [https://perma.cc/6JES-ZJUG] (finding
“disparate treatment of neighborhoods with different racial characteristics”). See also Abbye Atkinson,
Borrowing Equality, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1457 (2022) (arguing that “If Congress is serious about
subsidizing borrowing as a means of equality and mobility, then it has to align both the front and backend aspects—the economic and noneconomic aspects of credit and debt.”).
22. See Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, & Deborah Thorne, Portraits of Bankruptcy Filers, 56
GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 47–54), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3807592
[https://perma.cc/W7JQ-83ZG] (identifying the potential benefits and difficulties from bankruptcy,
including what it can and cannot resolve).
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struggle.23 Because people shy away from filing bankruptcy and, instead, ask their
lenders for help, interventions at the pre-bankruptcy modification request stage
are crucial to helping borrowers realize that bankruptcy may be the better
option.24 Incentivizing lenders to only offer loan modifications that borrowers can
afford going forward, as this Article suggests, should shepherd people toward
bankruptcy when modification, particularly of unsecured loans, will be
comparably disadvantageous and costly over the long term.
II
THE COMING LOAN MODIFICATION CRASH
Relief efforts stemming from the pandemic have resulted in forbearances
across various credit products. Understanding the state and nature of these
consumer credit markets is fundamental to properly anticipating and affecting
loan modification behavior. This Part reviews data about the state of major
consumer credit markets (mortgages, student loans, auto loans, and credit cards)
to predict the need for loan modifications.
A. Troubled Credit Markets
Largely because the mortgage loan market is heavily intertwined with federal
agency support and monitoring,25 there exists rich data about mortgage loans. In
January 2021, the total number of mortgage loans in forbearance was 5.2%, with
variances from that percentage depending on the specific government mortgage
program. Figure 1 draws on data compiled by the data analytics firm Black Knight
to show the forbearance differences between loan types.26

23. Foohey et al., supra note 18.
24. This Article’s recommendations can be coupled with changes to bankruptcy laws to account for
the fuller range of modifications. In some instances, modification outside bankruptcy will be more
effective for borrowers. See Alan M. White & Carolina Reed, Saving Homes? Bankruptcy and Loan
Modifications in the Foreclosure Crisis, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1713, 1723 (2013) (finding that modifications to
loans may be more effective at preventing foreclosure). In other instances, bankruptcy can better help
borrowers. See infra note 104.
25. Christopher K. Odinet, Modernizing Mortgage Law, 100 N.C. L. REV. 89, 93 (2021).
26. BLACK KNIGHT, MORTGAGE MONITOR 7 (Jan. 2021), https://cdn.blackknightinc.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/03/BKI_MM_Jan2021_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NDP-CGTX].
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Figure 1
Mortgage Loans under Active Forbearance Plans
by Loan Project Type
(May 2020 through March 2021)

Borrowers who opted for a mortgage loan forbearance have two notable
common traits. First, these individuals have lower credit scores than those
homeowners who did not opt for a forbearance—a difference of about forty-six
points.27 Second, those who received a forbearance carried a mortgage loan
balance about thirty percent greater than that of people who did not.28 These data
points suggest that more financially troubled homeowners have obtained
mortgage relief—people on the lower end of the credit spectrum and people less
likely to have built up significant equity in their homes.
As to student loans, the credit reporting agency Experian reported that as of
the third quarter of 2020, seventy-two percent of all student loans were in
forbearance or deferral.29 A considerable proportion of these are likely part of
27. Andrew Haughwout, Donghoon Lee, Joelle Scally, & Wilbert van der Klaaw, Following
Borrowers through Forbearance, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y.: LIBERTY ST. ECON. (Nov. 17, 2020),
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2020/11/following-borrowers-through-forbearance.html
[https://perma.cc/53JE-LRU7].
28. Id.
29. Stefan Lembo Stolba, Student Loan Debt Reaches Record High as Most Repayment Is Paused,
EXPERIAN (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/state-of-student-loan-debt/
[https://perma.cc/K8UX-KELA]. Both forbearance and deferral pause student loan debt payments for a
period of time, but in forbearance interest continues to accrue, while in deferment interest does not. See
generally What Is the Difference Between a Deferment and a Forbearance?, FED. STUDENT AID,
https://studentaid.gov/help-center/answers/article/difference-between-deferment-and-forbearance
[https://perma.cc/9C6P-YLV2].
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the U.S. Department of Education’s automatic pause on payments and reduction
of interest rates for many loans to zero percent. And yet despite this effort, the
growth of student debt more than doubled from 2019 to 2020.30
The auto loan market merits separate attention because of the pre-pandemic
boom in subprime auto lending31 and because of cars’ heightened importance
during the pandemic in light of curtailed public transit options.32 Despite cars’
importance, none of the federal relief packages provided for auto debt relief.
Instead, people were required to consult lenders or loan servicers if they
encountered problems paying auto loans.
Although systemic data about auto loans is not available, other indicators
suggest that people struggled with auto debt during the pandemic. For example,
between March and July 2020, the CFPB reported a sharp uptick in submitted
complaints, with one in five dealing with auto loans or leases.33 Consumer
borrowers noted trouble obtaining relief, problems with changing loan terms and
incorrect billing, and dealing with aggressive auto debt collectors.34 Data from the
New York Federal Reserve Bank and Equifax show that auto loan forbearances
rose from less than $1 million in March 2020 to a height of $8 million in June
2020. They then tapered off to around $5 million in September 2020 and declined
slowly through the spring of 2021.35 Additionally, as with mortgage loans,
borrowers who obtained auto loan relief in 2020 had similar traits: they had lower
credit scores (about forty points lower) and higher outstanding loan balances
(about thirty percent higher) than those who did not enter a forbearance.36 This
information, as with mortgage loans, indicates the relative financial fragility of
those people in auto loan forbearance.
Lastly, during the pandemic, people sought credit card forbearances. As with
auto loans, federal relief did not address credit card or similar unsecured
30. Stolba, supra note 29. The student debt market, at present, stands apart from all other consumer
credit markets because its primary creditor is the United States Department of Education. See Jiménez
& Glater, supra note 17, at 153 (noting that “[s]tudent loan servicers are firms hired by the Department
to provide loan servicing and collection on its $1.5 trillion portfolio of student loans”).
31. See generally Pamela Foohey, Bursting the Auto Loan Bubble in the Wake of COVID-19, 106
IOWA L. REV. 2215 (2021).
32. Jack Stewart, Pandemic Shifts People’s Feelings about Owning a Car, MARKETPLACE (July 20,
2020), https://www.marketplace.org/2020/07/20/pandemic-shifts-peoples-feelings-about-owning-a-car/
[https://perma.cc/FNG5-ZT5E].
33. U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, AUTO LOAN COMPLAINTS RISE 2 (Oct. 2020),
https://uspirgedfund.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/AutoLoanComplaintsRise/WEB_USP_CFPB-AutoLoan_Report_1020_v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6ZV-CZTY].
34. Id. at 11–23.
35. Haughwout et al., supra note 27; Tanya Bakshi & Jonathan Rose, What Happened to Subprime
Auto Loans During the Covid-19 Pandemic?, CHI. FED INSIGHTS (June 30, 2021), https://www.chicago
fed.org/publications/blogs/chicago-fed-insights/2021/what-happened-subprime-auto-loans
[https://perma.cc/JA69-5MNX]; see also José J. Canals-Cerdá & Brian Jonghwan Lee, COVID-19 and
Auto Loan Origination Trends (Fed. Res. Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 21-28, 2021),
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/frbp/assets/working-papers/2021/wp21-28.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VG3X-5GP3] (noting a drop in auto loan originations in March and April, but a near
rebound in May and June).
36. Haughwout et al., supra note 27.
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consumer debt.37 People had to make specific deals with their credit card lenders
or other creditors to obtain forbearances. Reports indicate some forbearances
were granted. In the third quarter of 2020, only 1.53 percent of bank issued credit
card accounts were thirty days or more past due.38 However, data from the
American Bankers Association indicate that many households used their
stimulus checks to pay off existing credit card debt, suggesting that the percentage
of accounts in forbearance is quite low.39 The types of forbearances entered
vary.40 Some agreements deferred or lowered the monthly payment, while other
agreements waived late fees or reduced interest rates.41
As vaccination rates increased and the country began reopening, some
consumer credit markets seemed more troubled than others. Chief among the
markets to watch is the mortgage market because it accounts for nearly seventy
percent of all household debt and it drives so many spending decisions.42 How
households handle their auto debt, student loan debt, and credit card debt also
will be important in the period after relief programs expire. Collectively, these
three credit products constitute twenty-five percent of household debt.43 Each of
these products plays an important role in how households manage liquidity
mismatches, get to work, obtain employment, and cover unexpected expenses.
Concern over the people currently in forbearance across these products is
warranted given that data show that their profile generally correlates with people
who chronically struggle financially.
B. Need For Debt Relief
Forbearance does not mean forgiveness. At the end of the forbearance
period, missed payments must be accounted for, which can mean a significant
37. For a discussion of the rise in online unsecured installment loans, see Christopher K. Odinet,
Consumer Bitcredit and Fintech Lending, 69 ALA. L. REV. 781, 800 (2018) (citing a number of factors
that have contributed to the rise of fintech lending); Christopher K. Odinet, Securitizing Digital Debts,
52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 477, 483 (2020) (discussing the shift in credit markets with the rise of fintech platforms);
Christopher K. Odinet, Predatory Fintech and the Politics of Banking, 106 IOWA L. REV. 101, 108 (2021)
(stating that “[t]he combination of a dearth in the availability of consumer credit in the wake of the
financial crisis on the one hand and rapid innovations in technology on the other have created the perfect
conditions for Silicon Valley tech firms to enter the consumer finance space.”).
38. ABA Report: Delinquencies Improved in Second and Third Quarters of 2020, AM. BANKERS
ASS’N
(Jan.
22,
2021),
https://www.aba.com/about-us/press-room/press-releases/aba-reportdelinquencies-improved-in—second-and-third-quarters-of-2020 [https://perma.cc/NVY5-RRGS].
39. Id.
40. See Ben Luthi, Credit Card Forbearance Programs Help With Piling Bills—But Should You Use
Them?, FOX BUS. (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.foxbusiness.com/money/credit-card-forbearanceprograms-bills [https://perma.cc/7JVK-7YQ8] (noting that forbearance plans and terms vary across credit
card companies).
41. Credit Card Debt During Coronavirus: Relief Options and Tips, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU (May 19, 2020), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/credit-card-debt-duringcoronavirus-relief-options-tips/ [https://perma.cc/3HVN-LADN].
42. See The State of Household Debt in America, VISUAL CAPITALIST (May 16, 2021), https://www.
visualcapitalist.com/the-state-of-household-debt-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/RW3M-DVR7] (showing
that mortgage debt has grown from $5.1 trillion since 2003 and now stands at $10.04 trillion).
43. Id.
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increase in financial obligations during a time when, at best, individuals are just
getting back on their feet. Some borrowers still may be struggling financially
when paused debt obligations resume. And some borrowers who did not request
or did not receive modifications during the pandemic may find themselves unable
to keep up with all their debt payments as they continue to deal with the
accumulated financial fallout of the pandemic.
For those who entered forbearance, the accounting for missed payments
often came in the form of a modification of the loan contract—that is, a change
in terms of the original deal.44 Some modifications give the borrower more time
to pay, with missed payments spread over an additional period. Other
modifications may require the borrower to make up the missed payments via an
increased monthly amount for the remainder of the original term. Still other
modifications may require the borrower to pay all the missed payments at once—
termed a balloon or bullet payment—and then resume regular payments as
provided by the original deal.
Borrowers who agreed to increased payments or balloon payments as part of
their post-forbearance modification deal may be especially vulnerable to
difficulties keeping up with the modified obligation in the coming months and
years. Likewise, other borrowers may have trouble meeting various debt
obligations for a variety of reasons that have festered during the pandemic. Even
though the job market improved in 2021, months of unemployment can take a
financial (and health) toll. Being employed does not mean that someone’s current
job is as stable as it was pre-pandemic, as exemplified by Black and Latine
workers’ employment numbers that continue to lag behind white workers.45
Those hit the hardest by the pandemic were “essential workers,” minorities, and
women, particularly those individuals not protected by unions or collective
bargaining agreements.46 Pre-pandemic, female-led and minority households, on
average, had less money saved to weather financial hardships. Thus, these
households may have the most difficulties recovering, particularly as they are
required to restart paying paused debts.47
44. Sometimes the accounting for the missed payments takes the form of a refinancing of the
credit—the taking out of another loan to pay off the existing one. The availability of this option on
affordable terms depends upon the debtor’s creditworthiness.
45. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
46. See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, Default Protections for Pandemic Essential Workers, 85
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2022, at 177.
47. See Emily Moss, Kriston McIntosh, Wendy Edelberg, & Kristen Broady, The Black-White
Wealth Gap Left Black Households More Vulnerable, BROOKINGS (Dec. 8, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/12/08/the-black-white-wealth-gap-left-black-householdsmore-vulnerable/ [https://perma.cc/8G73-AFDU] (identifying wealth as a “critical safety net to
households during economic downturns”); Neil Bhutta, Andrew C. Chang, Lisa J. Dettling, & Joanne W.
Hsu, Disparities in Wealth by Race and Ethnicity in the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances, FEDS NOTES
(Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/disparities-in-wealth-by-raceand-ethnicity-in-the-2019-survey-of-consumer-finances-20200928.htm
[https://perma.cc/JL6C-GN9S]
(finding that wealth disparities between families of different racial and ethnic groups have only
marginally changed since last surveyed in 2016); The Basic Facts About Women in Poverty, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/basic-facts-women-poverty/
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Regardless of the reasons for struggling with debt payments, people will
eventually approach their lenders for help.48 In most circumstances, the loan
servicer is the party that handles the modification and makes the decisions about
modification terms. Government agencies can promulgate guidance or
regulations regarding modifications, as is the case currently with most mortgage
loans, but not other consumer credit, such as auto loans and credit cards, as
detailed in the next two Parts.
III
PLANNING FOR LOAN MODIFICATIONS
With any loan modification, the goal for both the lender and the consumer
should be to achieve not only a modification but a successful one—that is, a
modification with terms that the consumer can afford. Important lessons can be
learned from the federal government’s previous attempts to encourage loan
modifications. This Part analyzes prior government interventions in the home
mortgage market and how they failed to achieve meaningful modifications.
A. Past Modification Failures
After the 2008 financial crisis, the federal government created two major
programs to entice mortgage loan servicers to make loan modifications so people
could remain in their homes. The Home Affordable Modification Program
(“HAMP”) primarily offered modifications of existing loan terms, usually by
lowering the interest rate or lengthening the repayment term.49 The Home
Affordable Refinance Program (“HARP”) primarily refinanced existing loans
into loans with lower market interest rates.50
These two programs largely failed, both because of poor program design.
Rather than giving homeowners money to pay their mortgage loans, HAMP gave
money to mortgage servicers in exchange for modifying loan terms. Servicers,
who are paid by taking a percentage of the unpaid outstanding principal balance
due on the loan and who are entitled to a portion of the late fees and expenses of
a foreclosure, had no reason to participate in this government program.51 By
September 2015, only $10.2 billion of the $75 billion set aside for HAMP had
[https://perma.cc/3VGR-QL2E] (noting that women have higher rates of poverty than men across the
vast majority of races and ethnicities).
48. See Foohey et al., supra note 18, at 241 (noting that people who file bankruptcy report that they
approached their lenders for help with debt payments prior to filing).
49. See Making Home Affordable Updated Detailed Program Description, U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY (Mar. 4, 2009), https://docplayer.net/14931738-Making-home-affordable-updated-detailedprogram-description.html [https://perma.cc/T8L4-LAG2] (“The Home Affordable Modification
program has a simple goal: reduce the amount homeowners owe per month to sustainable levels.”).
50. See generally Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY,
https://www.fhfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/Programs/Pages/HARP.aspx
[https://perma.cc/2ALSHQXS].
51. CHRISTOPHER K. ODINET, FORECLOSED: MORTGAGE SERVICING AND THE HIDDEN
ARCHITECTURE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 51 (2019).
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been spent52 and twenty-eight percent of modified loans had defaulted.53 HARP
provided meager incentives to banks to refinance underwater mortgage loans,
leading most lenders to continue to view refinancing these loans as risky.54
Spurred in part by the failures with HAMP and HARP, debt settlement
companies played a significant role in modifications after the 2008 financial crisis.
These companies, which remain part of the consumer finance market, promise to
provide an easy solution to dealing with creditors when a borrower is in default
or experiencing related financial trouble. The company negotiates with creditors
on the borrower’s behalf and works out a deal for the borrower to pay less than
the full amount that is owed.55 Typically the negotiated deal requires that the
borrower open a special account to set aside a certain amount of savings each
month. That money is used to pay the settlement amount.56 The debt settlement
company collects a fee in exchange for the service.57
During the 2008 financial crisis, people’s use of debt settlement sometimes
yielded harmful results.58 Debt settlement companies do not guarantee that they
will succeed in making a deal with their clients’ creditors.59 Yet they typically
encourage clients to stop making payments directly to creditors so that the
company can become the single point of contact. This can result in late fees,
negative credit reporting, and the seizure of property.60 Apart from the inherent
riskiness of this business model, during the 2008 financial crisis, the industry
became known for its high rate of fraud.61 Some debt settlement companies
collected fees on the front end without ever achieving a settlement, and some
52. David Dayen, Obama Program That Hurt Homeowners and Helped Big Banks Is Ending, THE
INTERCEPT (Dec. 28, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/12/28/obama-program-hurt-homeowners-andhelped-big-banks-now-its-dead/ [https://perma.cc/Z8TL-8T3G]; Andy Kroll, Worst $75 Billion
Investment Ever?, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 8, 2009), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/12/hampforeclosure-program-failure/ [https://perma.cc/7YXR-EKE5].
53. David Dayen, The Government Program That Failed Homeowners, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 30,
2014), https://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/mar/30/government-program-save-homes-mortgagesfailure-banks [https://perma.cc/AQ9K-PU3G].
54. Cora Currier, Lack of Competition Stifles Refinance Program for Underwater Homeowners,
PROPUBLICA (Apr. 5, 2012), https://www.propublica.org/article/lack-of-competition-stifles-refinanceprogram-for-underwater-homeowners [https://perma.cc/XJ4T-ZV7C]. Also, large mortgage lenders
preferred to refinance only their existing underwater customers rather than to assist others. Id.
55. What are Debt Settlement/Debt Relief Services and Should I Use Them?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-are-debt-settlementdebtrelief-services-and-should-i-use-them-en-1457/ [https://perma.cc/3THP-4UV8].
56. Settling Credit Card Debt, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 2012),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0145-settling-credit-card-debt [https://perma.cc/8WV6-C478].
57. What are Debt Settlement/Debt Relief Services and Should I Use Them?, supra note 55.
58. See Debt Relief and Credit Repair Scams, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/media-resources/consumer-finance/debt-relief-credit-repair-scams [https://perma.cc/N56Y5W96] (noting, for example, how many scams “charge[d] cash-strapped consumers a large up-front fee,
but then fail[ed] to help them settle or lower their debts.”).
59. Settling Credit Card Debt, supra note 56.
60. Id.
61. See generally How Not to Spell Relief: Debt Relief Scams, DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 16, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/how-not-spell-relief-debt-relief-scams [https://perma.cc/L4544X4V].
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posed as government relief programs to entice participation.62 For instance, a
debt settlement business that operated under many names and across multiple
states collected fees between $2,500 and $4,300 by promising distressed
homeowners that they were already approved for a loan modification, when, in
actuality, the company had never been in touch with the relevant mortgage
servicers.63
Past attempts by the federal government to encourage mortgage
modifications in the wake of a financial crisis did not succeed.64 These programs’
failure during a period of intense need for modifications helped grow an industry
that preyed on desperate borrowers. The debt settlement industry also benefited
during the 2008 financial crisis from the federal government’s lack of any
program at all to deal with non–mortgage consumer debt. As the United States
emerges from the pandemic, the government can learn from its mistakes, both in
the home mortgage market and in leaving people on their own to determine how
to manage other debts.
B. Learning From Past Mistakes: Modifications And Credit Market
Heterogeneity
In the coming months, people may find that they need to seek loan
modifications. When they do, people will find that the type of modifications their
creditors offer will depend on the specific credit product. This will make
navigating potential loan modifications with a host of different creditors and on
different timelines complicated. Although federal agencies thus far have stepped
up in the context of home mortgage loans, other consumer credit markets have
thus far escaped scrutiny. This presents an opportunity for federal agencies to
plan, in particular, for all the other potential modifications to provide people with
a workable framework before they turn to their creditors for help. The steps that
federal agencies have taken to address home mortgage loan issues emerging postpandemic can inform potential solutions that agencies may implement in regard
to other parts of the consumer loan market.
1. Home Mortgages
In contrast to the feeble programs instituted for mortgage loans during the
2008 financial crisis, as the United States emerged from the pandemic, federal
62. Settling Credit Card Debt, supra note 56.
63. California Ringleader Sentenced in Connecticut to 112 Months for Mortgage Fraud Scheme, U.S.
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (July 18, 2016), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/california-ringleadersentenced-connecticut-112-months-mortgage-fraud-scheme [https://perma.cc/Z84A-2AVX].
64. For a review of voluntary mortgage modification as the United States was emerging from the
Great Recession, see generally Alan M. White, Deleveraging the American Homeowner: The Failure of
2008 Voluntary Mortgage Contract Modifications, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1007 (2009); Alan M. White,
Rewriting Contracts, Wholesale: Data on Voluntary Mortgage Modifications from 2007 and 2008
Remittance Reports, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509 (2009). See also Jonathan C. Lipson, Securitization and
Social Distance, 37 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 827 (2018) (linking why real-property mortgage-backed
securities performed worse than other securitized assets during the Great Recession with incentivizes to
enter into mortgage modifications).
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agencies seemed to be planning for a wave of mortgage loan modifications.
Between the CARES Act, individual government agency policies65 and the
CFPB’s recent rule to amend the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974
(“RESPA”),66 no residential mortgage foreclosure will occur until 2022. This
elongated respite provided government mortgage agencies time through 2021 to
provide their servicers with forbearance instructions and preset modification
packages for dealing with distressed homeowners.
In spring 2021, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac instructed their servicers, at the
end of the forbearance, to determine whether borrowers should make up the
payments either in a lump sum or in accordance with a payment plan under
modified loan terms.67 Because they largely operate through market power rather
than through any kind of regulatory control, Fannie and Freddie can make
changes to their servicing guidelines without the need for formal comment and
rulemaking.68 This provides Fannie and Freddie with nimble control over their
servicers, allowing them to respond rather quickly to changing needs of
borrowers.
For those borrowers seeking loan modifications, post-forbearance or
otherwise, Fannie and Freddie publicly released two options. Under the COVID19 Deferral option, if the borrower is financially able to resume the contractual
monthly payment, then up to one year’s worth of forborne payments will be
added as a zero interest balloon payment due at the time the loan is to be paid
off.69 The Flex Modification option is available for borrowers who cannot resume
65. See, e.g., Fannie Mae Lender Letter 2020-02, FANNIE MAE (Dec. 9, 2020) [hereinafter Lender
Letter 2020-02], https://singlefamily.fanniemae.com/media/22261/display [https://perma.cc/9UVY-FC68];
Bulletin 2021-8: Temporary Servicing Guidance Related to COVID-19, FREDDIE MAC (Feb. 25, 2021)
[hereinafter Bulletin 2021-8], https://guide.freddiemac.com/app/guide/bulletin/2021-8
[https://perma.cc/747S-8J5E].
66. See Protections for Borrowers Affected by the COVID-19 Emergency Under the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), Regulation X, 86 Fed. Reg. 18840 (Apr. 9, 2021) (amending 12
C.F.R. § 1024.41(f)).
67. COVID-19 Script for Servicer Use with Homeowners, FREDDIE MAC (Jan. 20, 2022), https://sf.
freddiemac.com/content/_assets/resources/pdf/covid-19_forbearance-servicer-script.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RLL5-BAM9]. The FHFA director later stated that lump sum payments will not be
required. “No Lump Sum Required at the End of Forbearance” says FHFA’s Calabria, FED. HOUS.
ADMIN. (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/No-Lump-Sum-Required-atthe-End-of-Forbearance-says-FHFAs-Calabria.aspx
[https://perma.cc/NWC4-TUX8].
See
also
OVERSIGHT BY FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC OF COMPLIANCE WITH FORBEARANCE
REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE CARES ACT AND IMPLEMENTING GUIDANCE BY MORTGAGE
SERVICERS, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY 12 (2020), https://www.
fhfaoig.gov/sites/default/files/OIG-2020-004.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZE3V-GNHD] (assessing Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae’s oversight of their respective mortgage servicers’ compliance with the CARES
Act).
68. See Cnty. of Sonoma v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 710 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that,
under HERA, if the directive challenged is a lawful exercise of FHFA’s power as conservator of the
Enterprises, the court system’s ability to review such action is significantly limited).
69. Payment Deferrals Matrix, FANNIE MAE (Dec. 14, 2021), https://singlefamily.fanniemae.com/
media/22936/display [https://perma.cc/6S83-RYSB]; Bulletin 2020-15: Freddie Mac COVID-19 Payment
Deferral, FREDDIE MAC (May 13, 2020) [hereinafter Bulletin 2020-15], https://guide.
freddiemac.com/app/guide/bulletin/2020-15 [https://perma.cc/C7TR-XUHY].
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contractual payments, decline to resume payments, or are ineligible for the
deferral option.70 Under Flex Modification, the borrower enters a three-month
trial period plan with revised mortgage terms, such as capitalizing the missed
interest and escrow payments into the principal amount, changing the interest
rate, expanding the loan term, or lowering the portion of the principal that bears
interest.71 Determining which or how many of these revisions to implement
involves a complicated analysis furnished by Fannie and Freddie in their servicing
guidelines.72 The Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) likewise published
four options for COVID-related loan modifications for borrowers if they want to
remain in their homes, and borrowers may request one of these options even if
they did not participate in a forbearance program.73
Freddie, Fannie, and the FHA control the majority of mortgages in
America.74 The forethought involved in implementing standardized modification
packages for their servicers is a notable departure from how modifications were
handled in the post-2008 financial crisis period, during which significant
discretion was left to the servicers. Nonetheless, foreseeable problems may
emerge in the coming months and years. Private servicers will be the entities
carrying out these modifications. This is potentially problematic because the
mortgage servicing industry is currently dominated by nonbank financial firms.75
Nonbanks are much more thinly capitalized and less regulated compared to bank
servicers.76 They lack resources to quickly hire and train staff, as well as to invest
in the tech infrastructure, both of which may be necessary to assist financially
struggling borrowers as forbearances end.77
Also, though well-intentioned, the modification guidance issued by Freddie,
Fannie, and the FHA is complicated. The steps that the servicer must walk
through to determine eligibility and to properly modify the loan requires a high
level of skill.78 Servicing staff will need to be trained for the task.
70. Fannie Mae Lender Letter 2020-07, FANNIE MAE (Nov. 18, 2020), https://singlefamily.
fanniemae.com/media/22916/display [https://perma.cc/4JK5-9SVQ]; Bulletin 2020-15, supra note 69.
71. Servicing Guide, FANNIE MAE (Mar. 10, 2021), https://singlefamily.fanniemae.com/media/
25291/display [https://perma.cc/8G5W-W9R3]; Seller/Servicer Guide, FREDDIE MAC (Feb. 2, 2022),
https://guide.freddiemac.com/ci/okcsFattach/get/1002095_2 [https://perma.cc/Y8QM-GE23].
72. For example, the Freddie Mac Seller/Servicer Guide includes over 2000 pages of servicer
guidelines. See id.
73. Mortgagee Letter 2021-05, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV. (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.hud.
gov/sites/dfiles/OCHCO/documents/2021-05hsgml.pdf [https://perma.cc/36CV-G724].
74. See MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, REFORM: CREATING A SUSTAINABLE, MORE VIBRANT
SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET 39 (2017),
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/17305_MBA_GSE_Reform_Paper%20(2).
pdf [https://perma.cc/5B8D-4QUW].
75. See ODINET, supra note 51, at 124–25 (noting that nonbanks have quickly expanded due to their
lack of overhead and avoidance of the “legacy technology costs” that plague established banking
institutions).
76. Id. at 125–26.
77. Id. at 124.
78. See, e.g., Flex Modification Reference Guide, FREDDIE MAC (Jan. 2022), https://sf.freddiemac.
com/content/_assets/resources/pdf/other/flex_mod_ref_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9YX-4SKN]. See

FOOHEY (DO NOT DELETE)

216

4/24/2022 7:20 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 85: 201

2. Other Consumer Credit Products
The government’s involvement in the housing debt market has allowed for
the creation of coordinated and streamlined mortgage modification programs.
The same can be said for the student loan market where the federal government
similarly dominates the landscape. In contrast, the government’s lack of
involvement in other consumer credit markets makes similar centralized loan
modification programs impossible. Central to this Article, these markets include
auto loans, credit cards, and other revolving credit and installment loans. Instead,
at present, each creditor has nearly complete discretion in if and how to modify
non-mortgage debt contract obligations. This presents a potential problem for
the people who will seek loan modifications post-pandemic in the coming months
and years, and an opportunity to intervene in these markets before people start
seeking modifications in bulk.
Because of a lack of uniformity among credit products and creditors, under
the status quo, modification failures may abound, similar to what happened in
the mortgage market after the 2008 financial crisis. Two types of modification
failures are reasonable to predict. First, a creditor may engage in abusive
behavior by placing a borrower into an unaffordable loan modification that is
geared less toward helping the individual get back on track and more toward
exploitation for additional profit. Second, a creditor may hastily agree to a
modification with a borrower that does not carefully consider the borrower’s
ability to successfully repay the modified loan.
In either scenario, many borrowers may be likely to agree to modifications
that are not in their financial interests or that they may not be able to successfully
pay in full. In the case of auto loans, borrowers worry about losing cars that are
essential to their livelihoods and to taking care of their families.79 They will agree
to the deal put before them by their lenders. In addition, in the case of the range
of consumer credit loans, because most borrowers are biased towards optimism,
they will overestimate their ability to pay the modified loan, and agree to the deal
put before them.80 Likewise, in the case of all loans, because borrowers generally
try to live up to their obligations and feel shame when unable to pay, they will be
likely to agree to the deal put before them.81
Knowing that borrowers are often held captive by lenders’ suggested
modification deals for these primary reasons, lenders and servicers naturally may

also supra note 72.
79. See generally Pamela Foohey, Consumers’ Declining Power in the Fintech Auto Loan Market, 15
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 5 (2020) (detailing people’s dependency on cars); Pamela Foohey,
Robert M. Lawless, & Deborah Thorne, Driven to Bankruptcy, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 287 (2020)
(detailing people who file bankruptcy with the primary goal of keeping their cars).
80. See Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial Literacy, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 235 (2008) (finding that
“[p]eople maintain overoptimism about their own susceptibility to risks through overconfidence or
illusions” and that “[o]veroptimism and overconfidence in personal-finance decisionmaking is
widespread.”).
81. See Foohey et al., supra note 18, at 249 (noting that about two-thirds of bankruptcy filers report
that they felt shame upon filing).
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not always negotiate with borrower’s best interests in mind, particularly if they
are pressed for time or resources, such as when they are dealing with a flood of
modification requests. Post-pandemic, such a flood is likely to occur. For
unsecured loans, like credit cards, lenders also know that their recovery likely
will come solely from payments made by borrowers. Most people own little
property that the lender can attach via judicial process upon default.82 Although
carefully considering borrowers’ ability to repay may benefit lenders over the
longer term, lenders are just as likely to focus on short-term profits and attempt
to ensure that they recover now from borrowers. This focus would push lenders
to offer modifications that may be exploitative or, more simply, hastily put
together.
In either scenario, the probability of an eventual default—a modification
failure—increases as compared to a well-considered and pre-structured
modification. In addition, market heterogeneity likely will lead to irregularity and
uncertainty in communications between creditors and borrowers. If creditors are
not clear or responsive, frustrated borrowers may again turn to debt settlement
companies for help. However, individual lenders do not have an incentive to
reform or streamline their modification procedures, especially before they begin
experiencing an uptick in modification requests. But once borrowers come
knocking on lenders’ doors, it likely will be too late for them to timely change
their modification processes.
Being able to predict modification failures, however, allows for the
government to get ahead of the likely wave of non-mortgage loan modification
requests, as it has done in the context of the home mortgage market. That is, a
regulatory intervention in consumer credit markets is necessary to help
consumers given the predictable status quo. The next Part sketches how federal
financial regulators can achieve those interventions. As detailed, these
interventions also may help mitigate lingering issues with the streamlined
programs for mortgage modifications.
IV
MITIGATING LOAN MODIFICATION FAILURES
Any government move to get ahead of this wave of loan modifications across
consumer credit products, particularly auto loans and credit cards, must account
for both differentiated credit and how a jumbled modification roll-out can
welcome bad actor intermediaries. Federal financial regulators can play an
important role in incentivizing sustainable loan modifications as the United
States ends its COVID-related forbearance programs. This Part lays a legal
framework for public intervention in debt contract modifications that is designed
to steer people into affordable modification or, if there are no affordable options,
implicitly guides people to the consumer bankruptcy system.
82. See id. at 226 n.35 (noting that over ninety percent of chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy cases are
“no asset”).
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A. Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or Practices as Contract Steering
The goal of federal intervention in the context of modifications of nonmortgage consumer loans should be to prevent modification failures, whereby a
borrower’s ability to repay is intentionally, negligently, or merely inattentively
not considered during modification discussions and calculations. A blueprint for
how to make such modification essentially illegal follows.
Under federal law, the CFPB has the authority to identify abusive acts or
practices by certain covered financial institutions, including issuers of certain
auto loans, credit cards, and other installment or revolving loans.83 An act or
practice is considered abusive if it does any one of the following:
• Materially interferes with a consumer’s ability to understand terms or
conditions of the product or service;
• Takes unreasonable advantage of a consumer’s lack of understanding
of the product or service’s risks, costs, or conditions;
• Takes unreasonable advantage of the consumer’s inability to protect
his or her own interests when choosing or using a product or service;
or
• Takes unreasonable advantage of the consumer’s reliance on a
covered person to act in the consumer’s interests.84
Under this language, certain modification failures may be considered abusive,
providing the CFPB with authority to enforce the structure of modifications
offered by covered financial institutions. There are two main ways that the CFBP
can accomplish this. It can promulgate rules or issue a compliance bulletin. The
emergency situation created by the pandemic points toward using the faster
method of issuing a compliance bulletin. Indeed, the CFPB has issued compliance
bulletins in the past to highlight enforcement priorities.85
The compliance bulletin should direct loan servicers to make a reasonable
determination that a borrower has the ability to make all required, scheduled
payments in connection with any loan modification. This notice should include
factors that servicers must consider in making this determination, such as
accounting for the possibility of volatility in the individual’s income and for the
borrower’s other, competing debt obligations. Although lenders could not and
should not be deemed required to have predicted the COVID-19 pandemic and
its effect on household finances, by the time borrowers come to lenders for help,
most borrowers should have sufficient information about their financial futures
and other debt obligations to allow lenders to make a good faith calculation about
a borrower’s ability to repay. In the past, this type of private ordering has proven
83. 12 U.S.C. § 5531.
84. See 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d).
85. See, e.g., CFPB Bulletin 2021-02: Supervision and Enforcement Priorities Regarding Housing
Insecurity, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Apr. 1, 2021), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
documents/cfpb_bulletin-2021-02_supervision-and-enforcement-priorities-regardinghousing_WHcae8E.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V64-8M6P] (delineating the CFPB’s enforcement priorities in
the housing insecurity field).
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productive for both contracting parties.86 The notice can also indicate what the
bureau would presumptively deem an abusive practice, such as intentionally
lengthening the loan modification negotiation and decision timeline.87
Importantly, the CFPB could consider the failure of a covered loan servicer to
make a reasonable determination as prescribed by the bulletin an abusive act or
practice.
Although the Dodd-Frank Act does not elaborate on what constitutes abuse
beyond the four-part enumeration above, the use of this term in consumer
financial regulation is not new and has been similarly used in the past in the
context of consumer loan workouts. In 1994, Congress passed the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act, which authorized the Federal Reserve
Board to prohibit “abusive lending practices” in residential mortgage loans.88 In
passing that law, Congress was concerned with the refinancing of mortgage loans
that were “not in the interest of the borrower.”89 Coming out of the 2008 financial
crisis, the Federal Reserve Board exercised this statutory authority to issue an
amendment to the regulation implementing the Truth in Lending Act. The
amendment prohibited lenders from refinancing mortgage loans “without regard
to the consumer’s repayment ability,” which included a mandate that lenders
consider the “consumer’s current and reasonably expected income, employment,
assets other than the collateral, current obligations, and mortgage-related
obligations.”90
The same concerns about ability to repay should apply across consumer credit
products, and the CFPB has the statutory authority to implement this standard
across modifications offered regarding all covered consumer loans—mortgage,
auto, credit card, and otherwise. Nothing in the Dodd-Frank Act’s abusiveness
provision limits its reach to mortgage credit or to merely refinancing transactions.
Rather, as evident in the enumeration above, the coverage of statutory
abusiveness is expansive and broad. It is, as Adam Levitin has observed, a
codification of equitable concepts, such as good faith and fair dealing and
unconscionability.91 As such, it can and should be used by the CFPB to cover acts
or practices relative to the modification of all covered existing consumer credit
contracts—particularly auto loan and credit card contracts—which do not benefit
from systemic government intervention already.92
86. See Jonathan C. Lipson & Norman M. Powell, Contracting COVID: Private Order and Public
Good (Standstills), 76 BUS. LAW 437, 465 (2021) (discussing the role standstill and forbearance
agreements can play in subduing calamity costs).
87. See White, Deleveraging the American Homeowner, supra note 64, at 1113–24 (discussing
problems with mortgage modifications after the Great Recession).
88. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act § 152, 15 U.S.C. § 1639(p)(2)(b).
89. Id.
90. Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44521, 44603 (July 30, 2008) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
91. ADAM J. LEVITIN, CONSUMER FINANCE LAW: MARKETS AND REGULATION 205 (2018).
92. The CFPB can apply this standard to mortgage loans, buttressing existing oversight. This
Article’s suggested framework is meant to address the predicted swell of modification requests for auto
loans, credit cards, and other revolving and installment loans as the United States emerges from the
pandemic. These interventions are limited to the pandemic-recovery, which may be a few years. The
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B. Modification Failure as Abusiveness
Once the CFPB issues a compliance bulletin, its next task will be to ensure
that lenders know that it is ready to enforce the parameters. The credible threat
of enforcement will incentivize lenders to offer loan modifications that meet the
bulletin’s parameters. Loan modification failures will fit multiple parts of the
statutory abusiveness framework.
If the lender obscures or misrepresents the modification’s terms, such as how
the new periodic payments will be calculated or what amounts are being
capitalized into the loan, this may constitute a material interference with the
consumer’s ability to understand the terms of the modified contract. Depending
on the dynamic between the lender and the borrower, which almost always
consists of the lender having comparatively superior knowledge about the
product,93 the lender may take advantage of the consumer’s lack of
understanding, triggering the second or third abusiveness criteria. And,
concerning the fourth criteria, consumers most likely will express a desire for
their lenders to advise them as to the most ideal type of modification. People are
rarely if ever represented by counsel when working through loan modifications,94
particularly those of auto, credit card, or unsecured debt, and people typically
lack an individualized level of sophistication about financial terms.95 The bulletin
should note that if a lender fails to properly assess the borrower’s ability to repay,
but represents, directly or indirectly, that a modification is suitable for that
borrower, the lender may have engaged in an abusive act or practice.96
Moving a step further, the CFPB has the power to engage in formal
rulemaking, as it has done with other pandemic related issues.97 In the past, the
ideas within may be useful to consider on a permanent basis in the future. If so, a similar regulatory
framework may be used, although we suggest that the CFPB engage in rulemaking.
93. See Paige Marta Skiba & Will Dobbie, Information Asymmetries in Consumer Credit Markets:
Evidence from Payday Lending, 5 AM. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 256 (2013) (discussing information
asymmetries skewed toward lenders in payday lending).
94. See Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urb. Affs., 111th Cong. 48 (2010) (Statement of Sen. Richard C. Shelby,
Member, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urb. Affs.), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG111shrg65258/html/CHRG-111shrg65258.htm [https://perma.cc/4GBS-Y6PT].
95. See Lauren E. Willis, The Financial Education Fallacy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 429 (2011)
(discussing the inefficiency of current, ineffective financial education programs); see also Craig Hawley,
Most Americans Think They Know More about Money Than They Do, KIPLINGER (Oct. 28, 2019),
https://www.kiplinger.com/article/retirement/t047-c032-s014-most-think-they-know-more-about-moneythan-they-do.html [https://perma.cc/6PX3-MQB6] (discussing the financial literacy gap).
96. The CFPB has done this before. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Will Scrutinize
Consumer Protection During Mortgage Servicing Transfers, JONES DAY (Feb. 2013),
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2013/02/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-will-scrutinizeconsumer-protection-during-mortgage-servicing-transfers [https://perma.cc/PBB2-SU5U] (noting the
CFPB Bulletin “suggests that the failure to honor an agreed-upon trial or permanent loan modification,
including properly applying payments or collecting debts under such a modification, may be considered
a UDAAP violation”).
97. See CFPB Rule Clarifies Tenants Can Hold Debt Collectors Accountable for Illegal Evictions,
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/cfpb-rule-clarifies-tenants-can-hold-debt-collectors-accountable-for-illegal-evictions/
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CFPB used this power to propose a rule regarding high-cost, short term loans:
Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans.98 The first
version of the CFPB’s proposed rule deemed it to be an abusive act or practice
not to assess a borrower’s ability to repay these high-cost, short term loans.99
But proceedings by rulemaking have drawbacks, least of which is that it can
take significant time—time that many consumers may not have as their COVIDbased forbearance periods come to staggered and unpredictable ends. The CFPB
instead should act quickly through a compliance bulletin steering consumer
financial service companies subject to its Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or
Practices (“UDAAP”) enforcement authority towards offering workable and
affordable loan modifications.100 Doing so could lessen the racial and ethnic
disparities that almost inevitably emerge in the context of consumer financial
products.101 Lenders (and servicers) may want to enter into modifications with
borrowers, but history teaches that, unsupervised, they are likely to offer
different deals across racial and ethnic groups.102 Given the relative bargaining
power, it is the lender or servicer who sets the terms of any deal made, if there is
even one offered. Controls and monitoring of modification deal parameters
promise to lessen the disparities in modifications across different communities.
Given the pandemic’s disproportionate effect on communities of color, reducing
the potential disparities in loan modification deals offered to these communities
is of paramount importance and will provide greater economic benefits for
families and the economy. It also will lessen gender and class inequalities that
likewise may emerge in modifications.
Requiring people to be offered affordable loan modifications necessarily will
mean that some borrowers will not be able to get a modification. Some people
simply will not have enough money or expected future income to sustain
continued payments, even with a modification in loan terms. Without controls on
the parameters of modifications, lenders likely would offer people deals that
would end in default. These defaults would result in foreclosure of houses,
repossessions of cars, and collection actions, including wage garnishment, for
[https://perma.cc/8K3S-4S3S] (discussing a CFPB interim final rule supporting the CDC’s eviction
moratorium).
98. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 47863 (July 22,
2016), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-07-22/pdf/2016-13490.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5G876T2].
99. See Christopher K. Odinet, Payday Lenders, Vehicle Title Loans, and Small-Value Financing:
The CFPB’s Proposal to Regulate the Fringe Economy, 133 BANKING L. J. 263, 276–77 (2015) (discussing
the initial version of the CFPB proposed rule and its required ability-to-pay requirements).
100. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481(14), 5536(a)(1)(B) (including unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices
authority over covered persons under the definition of “federal consumer financial law.”). This authority
includes financial firms that service loans. 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a); 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6); 12 U.S.C. §
5481(15)(A)(1).
101. See Padi, supra note 21; Pamela Foohey & Nathalie Martin, Fintech’s Role in Exacerbating or
Reducing the Wealth Gap, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. 459, 477 (“Through these examples, we detail how debt
inequality compounds income inequality and exacerbates the racial and ethnic wealth gaps.”).
102. J. Michael Collins, Maximilian D. Schmeiser, & Carly Urban, Protecting Minority Homeowners:
Race, Foreclosure Counseling and Mortgage Modifications, 47 J. CONSUMER AFF. 289, 291 (2013).
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unsecured debts, such as credit cards. This, in turn, would lead some people to
file bankruptcy.103
Intercepting unsustainable loan modifications prior to their creation likely
will result in some people considering filing bankruptcy earlier than if they had
continued struggling with their debts for years. Although filing bankruptcy is
expensive, so is paying on an unworkable loan modification for months prior to
defaulting. A regulatory structure that pushes people toward bankruptcy has the
potential to mitigate overall losses, while allowing those who can pay their
modified debts to do so.
V
CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic brought a catastrophic financial shock that many
American households were not prepared to bear. In recognition of these
extraordinary circumstances, the federal government provided some monetary
aid to households. In addition to some level of direct payments to households,
the government extended people’s credit obligations through foreclosure,
eviction, and student loan payment moratoria. Some lenders followed suit by
offering forbearance of other non–covered consumer credit products.
Forbearance does not equal forgiveness, and people will have to make up
those missed payments in the future. As households emerge from the pandemic,
some inevitably will find themselves unable to keep up with debt payments.
Because of the pandemic’s disproportionate impact on Black and Latine
households, these borrowers are more likely to encounter difficulties paying all
their debt obligations. These borrowers and lower-income individuals already
disproportionately have sought help from their lenders during the forbearance
period.
A significant number of borrowers may approach their lenders for
modifications of debts, including mortgages, auto loans, and credit cards. Absent
modifications, the likely outcomes are default, foreclosure, repossession, wage
garnishment, and eventually, filing bankruptcy. Indeed, the consumer
bankruptcy system is a kind of insurance. But not all people who cannot keep up
with their debt obligations will turn to bankruptcy for help and, in some contexts,
modifications of problematic loans may be preferable for borrowers and lenders.
A desire to work with lenders to make good on their obligations, bankruptcy’s
stigma, lack of access to attorneys, and fears about bankruptcy’s impact on credit
scores may deter people from filing. For secured loans—mortgages and auto
loans—coming to deals with lenders outside bankruptcy may save people time
and money.104

103. See Foohey et al., supra note 22, at 3 (noting many individuals file for bankruptcy after
threatened or actual legal actions).
104. In December 2020, Senator Elizabeth Warren and Congressman Jerrold Nadler introduced the
Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2020, which would modernize the consumer bankruptcy system
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The 2008 financial crisis showed how ill-prepared lenders and the government
have been in the past to ensure that borrowers would be offered modifications,
particularly regarding mortgages, with terms that they could afford over the long
term and via an understandable process. As a result, debt consolidation
companies gained a stronghold. The pandemic’s economic fallout places
households in a similar position to where they found themselves following the
2008 financial crisis. A key difference is that home loans are not the only major
debt contract that people may be worried about keeping up with in the coming
months. Plus, the federal agencies that control the majority of mortgages in
America have thought ahead to provide standardized modification packages that
their servicers must use.
What the federal government has yet to address is all the other modifications
that people will seek—notably auto loans, credit cards, and other installment
credit. The crux of the problem across these credit products stems from the
diversity of creditors and credit problems. This heterogeneity has a strong
potential to result in lenders and their servicers offering people modifications
that will end in default, a result which history teaches is even more likely for
Black, Latine, and lower-income borrowers. And, similar to the 2008 financial
crisis, debt consolidation companies again may capture the market for
modifications, which could lead to economically destructive results. As with
mortgages, streamlined regulations for the process and substance of modification
are needed. Given its regulatory breadth and authority, the CFPB offers a natural
place to situate these regulations via its UDAAP powers.
The benefits of the CFPB issuing the type of compliance bulletin we suggest
will differ based on credit product. For secured debts, such as mortgages and auto
loans, for which bankruptcy essentially offers modification deals that allow
people to keep houses and cars, a streamlined modification process should save
time and money for lenders and borrowers. In the context of mortgages, adding
the CFPB’s guidance will bolster what other federal agencies already have
outlined, serving as a check on the potential for these programs’ complexity to
hinder the issuance of productive modifications.
For unsecured debts, such as credit cards, under the CFPB’s guidance, lenders
may not be able to offer people modifications that they have the ability to repay.
In these instances, borrowers may recognize that filing bankruptcy to discharge
these unsecured debts is the most financially productive option. In steering
borrowers away from modifications, the requirements proposed in this Article
should save people time and money, which will bring more economic benefits
and would provide debtors with the ability to modify individual debts, such as a mortgage or a car loan
similar to what this proposal in the Article may incentivize outside of bankruptcy. Warren and Nadler
Introduce the Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2020, SEN. ELIZABETH WARREN (Dec. 9, 2020),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-and-nadler-introduce-the-consumerbankruptcy-reform-act-of-2020 [https://perma.cc/UW4L-SNUH]. Bankruptcy law currently has statutory
barriers to modification of mortgages and auto loans and requires debtors to deal with all their debts
simultaneously. See Foohey et al., supra note 22, at 51–54 (discussing ideas for tailoring bankruptcy to
account for differences among the people who file bankruptcy).
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overall. Now is the time for the federal government to consider how to incentivize
modifications across the range of consumer loans that borrowers will struggle
with during the coming months such that people will be offered workable deals
or will be ushered toward a way to reset their financial lives.

